CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2004-0488

Out-of-bounds Write

Published: Jul 07, 2004 | Modified: Nov 07, 2023
CVSS 3.x
N/A
Source:
NVD
CVSS 2.x
7.5 HIGH
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
Ubuntu
UNTRIAGED

Stack-based buffer overflow in the ssl_util_uuencode_binary function in ssl_util.c for Apache mod_ssl, when mod_ssl is configured to trust the issuing CA, may allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a client certificate with a long subject DN.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Name Vendor Start Version End Version
Http_server Apache 2.0.35 (including) 2.0.50 (excluding)
Apache2 Ubuntu dapper *
Apache2 Ubuntu devel *
Apache2 Ubuntu edgy *
Apache2 Ubuntu feisty *
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 RedHat httpd-0:2.0.46-32.ent.3 *
Red Hat Enterprise Linux AS (Advanced Server) version 2.1 RedHat *
Red Hat Enterprise Linux ES version 2.1 RedHat *
Red Hat Enterprise Linux WS version 2.1 RedHat *
Red Hat Linux Advanced Workstation 2.1 RedHat *
Red Hat Network Proxy v 4.2 (RHEL 3) RedHat jabberd-0:2.0s10-3.37.rhn *
Red Hat Network Proxy v 4.2 (RHEL 3) RedHat rhn-apache-0:1.3.27-36.rhn.rhel3 *
Red Hat Network Proxy v 4.2 (RHEL 3) RedHat rhn-modperl-0:1.29-16.rhel3 *
Red Hat Network Proxy v 4.2 (RHEL 4) RedHat jabberd-0:2.0s10-3.38.rhn *
Red Hat Network Proxy v 4.2 (RHEL 4) RedHat rhn-apache-0:1.3.27-36.rhn.rhel4 *
Red Hat Network Proxy v 4.2 (RHEL 4) RedHat rhn-modperl-0:1.29-16.rhel4 *
Red Hat Stronghold 4 RedHat *
Stronghold 4.0 for Red Hat Enterprise Linux AS (version 2.1) RedHat *

Potential Mitigations

  • Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

  • For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

  • Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

  • Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

  • Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

  • D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

  • Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

  • Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

  • Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

  • For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

  • Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

  • For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References