CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2007-0099

Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

Published: Jan 08, 2007 | Modified: Nov 21, 2024
CVSS 3.x
N/A
Source:
NVD
CVSS 2.x
9.3 HIGH
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
Ubuntu

Race condition in the msxml3 module in Microsoft XML Core Services 3.0, as used in Internet Explorer 6 and other applications, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) via many nested tags in an XML document in an IFRAME, when synchronous document rendering is frequently disrupted with asynchronous events, as demonstrated using a JavaScript timer, which can trigger NULL pointer dereferences or memory corruption, aka MSXML Memory Corruption Vulnerability.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Name Vendor Start Version End Version
Xml_core_services Microsoft 3.0 (including) 3.0 (including)

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

  • Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
  • Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

References