Race condition in Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 SP1; 6 and 7 for Windows XP SP2 and SP3; 6 and 7 for Server 2003 SP2; 7 for Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2; and 7 for Server 2008 SP2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or perform other actions upon a page transition, with the permissions of the old page and the content of the new page, as demonstrated by setInterval functions that set location.href within a try/catch expression, aka the bait & switch vulnerability or Race Condition Cross-Domain Information Disclosure Vulnerability.
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows_2003_server | Microsoft | sp1 (including) | sp1 (including) |
| Windows_2003_server | Microsoft | sp2 (including) | sp2 (including) |
| Windows_xp | Microsoft | * | * |
A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.