Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the Facebook Like Box (cardoza-facebook-like-box) plugin before 2.8.3 for WordPress allow remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that (1) change plugin settings via unspecified vectors or conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks via the (2) frm_title, (3) frm_url, (4) frm_border_color, (5) frm_width, or (6) frm_height parameter in the slug_for_fb_like_box page to wp-admin/admin.php.
The web application does not, or can not, sufficiently verify whether a well-formed, valid, consistent request was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the request.
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Use the “double-submitted cookie” method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user’s machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.