CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2015-9284

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Published: Apr 26, 2019 | Modified: Feb 14, 2024
CVSS 3.x
8.8
HIGH
Source:
NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS 2.x
6.8 MEDIUM
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
8.1 IMPORTANT
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Ubuntu
MEDIUM

The request phase of the OmniAuth Ruby gem (1.9.1 and earlier) is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery when used as part of the Ruby on Rails framework, allowing accounts to be connected without user intent, user interaction, or feedback to the user. This permits a secondary account to be able to sign into the web application as the primary account.

Weakness

The web application does not, or can not, sufficiently verify whether a well-formed, valid, consistent request was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the request.

Affected Software

Name Vendor Start Version End Version
Omniauth Omniauth * 2.0.0 (excluding)
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu bionic *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu cosmic *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu devel *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu disco *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu eoan *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu esm-apps/bionic *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu esm-apps/focal *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu esm-apps/jammy *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu esm-apps/noble *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu esm-apps/xenial *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu focal *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu groovy *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu hirsute *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu impish *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu jammy *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu kinetic *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu lunar *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu mantic *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu noble *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu oracular *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu upstream *
Ruby-omniauth Ubuntu xenial *

Potential Mitigations

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
  • Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
  • Use the “double-submitted cookie” method as described by Felten and Zeller:
  • When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user’s machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
  • Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
  • This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]

References