perltidy through 20160302, as used by perlcritic, check-all-the-things, and other software, relies on the current working directory for certain output files and does not have a symlink-attack protection mechanism, which allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files by creating a symlink, as demonstrated by creating a perltidy.ERR symlink that the victim cannot delete.
The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Perltidy | Perltidy_project | * | 2016-03-02 (including) |
Perltidy | Ubuntu | artful | * |
Perltidy | Ubuntu | esm-apps/xenial | * |
Perltidy | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
Perltidy | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
Perltidy | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
Perltidy | Ubuntu | yakkety | * |
Perltidy | Ubuntu | zesty | * |