Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10 Gold and 1511 allow remote attackers to hijack network traffic or bypass intended Enhanced Protected Mode (EPM) or application container protection mechanisms, and consequently render untrusted content in a browser, by leveraging how NetBIOS validates responses, aka NetBIOS Spoofing Vulnerability.
Weakness
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows_10 | Microsoft | - (including) | - (including) |
| Windows_10 | Microsoft | 1511 (including) | 1511 (including) |
| Windows_10 | Microsoft | 1607 (including) | 1607 (including) |
| Windows_7 | Microsoft | * | * |
| Windows_8.1 | Microsoft | * | * |
| Windows_rt_8.1 | Microsoft | * | * |
| Windows_server_2008 | Microsoft | –sp2 (including) | –sp2 (including) |
| Windows_server_2008 | Microsoft | r2-sp1 (including) | r2-sp1 (including) |
| Windows_server_2012 | Microsoft | - (including) | - (including) |
| Windows_server_2012 | Microsoft | r2 (including) | r2 (including) |
| Windows_vista | Microsoft | * | * |
Extended Description
Access control involves the use of several protection mechanisms such as:
When any mechanism is not applied or otherwise fails, attackers can compromise the security of the product by gaining privileges, reading sensitive information, executing commands, evading detection, etc. There are two distinct behaviors that can introduce access control weaknesses:
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/19.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/441.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/503.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/536.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/546.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html