CVE-2016-5399

The bzread function in ext/bz2/bz2.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted bz2 archive.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/137998/PHP-7.0.8-5.6.23-5.5.37-bzread-OOB-Write.html
• http://php.net/ChangeLog-5.php
• http://php.net/ChangeLog-7.php
• http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-2598.html
• http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-2750.html
• http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Jul/72
• http://www.debian.org/security/2016/dsa-3631
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/07/21/1
• http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/538966/100/0/threaded
• http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/92051
• http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1036430
• https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=72613
• https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1358395
• https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20180112-0001/
• https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40155/