In libavformat/asfdec_f.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in asf_build_simple_index() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted ASF file, which claims a large ict field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the for loop would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Ffmpeg | Ffmpeg | 3.3.3 (including) | 3.3.3 (including) |
Ffmpeg | Ubuntu | artful | * |
Ffmpeg | Ubuntu | esm-apps/xenial | * |
Ffmpeg | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
Ffmpeg | Ubuntu | zesty | * |
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.