In Drupal core 8.x prior to 8.3.4 and Drupal core 7.x prior to 7.56; Private files that have been uploaded by an anonymous user but not permanently attached to content on the site should only be visible to the anonymous user that uploaded them, rather than all anonymous users. Drupal core did not previously provide this protection, allowing an access bypass vulnerability to occur. This issue is mitigated by the fact that in order to be affected, the site must allow anonymous users to upload files into a private file system.
The product makes files or directories accessible to unauthorized actors, even though they should not be.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Drupal | Drupal | 7.0 (including) | 7.56 (excluding) |
| Drupal | Drupal | 8.0.0 (including) | 8.3.4 (excluding) |
| Drupal7 | Ubuntu | esm-apps/xenial | * |
| Drupal7 | Ubuntu | esm-infra-legacy/trusty | * |
| Drupal7 | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
| Drupal7 | Ubuntu | trusty/esm | * |
| Drupal7 | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
| Drupal7 | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
| Drupal7 | Ubuntu | yakkety | * |
| Drupal7 | Ubuntu | zesty | * |
Web servers, FTP servers, and similar servers may store a set of files underneath a “root” directory that is accessible to the server’s users. Applications may store sensitive files underneath this root without also using access control to limit which users may request those files, if any. Alternately, an application might package multiple files or directories into an archive file (e.g., ZIP or tar), but the application might not exclude sensitive files that are underneath those directories. In cloud technologies and containers, this weakness might present itself in the form of misconfigured storage accounts that can be read or written by a public or anonymous user.