PEAR Archive_Tar version 1.4.3 and earlier contains a CWE-502, CWE-915 vulnerability in the Archive_Tar class. There are several file operations with $v_header[filename] as parameter (such as file_exists, is_file, is_dir, etc). When extract is called without a specific prefix path, we can trigger unserialization by crafting a tar file with phar://[path_to_malicious_phar_file] as path. Object injection can be used to trigger destruct in the loaded PHP classes, e.g. the Archive_Tar class itself. With Archive_Tar object injection, arbitrary file deletion can occur because @unlink($this->_temp_tarname) is called. If another class with useful gadget is loaded, it may possible to cause remote code execution that can result in files being deleted or possibly modified. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.4.4.
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pear_archive_tar | Php | * | 1.4.3 (including) |
| Php-pear | Ubuntu | bionic | * |
| Php-pear | Ubuntu | cosmic | * |
| Php-pear | Ubuntu | devel | * |
| Php-pear | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
| Php-pear | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.