CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2018-10532

Use of Hard-coded Credentials

Published: Oct 30, 2018 | Modified: Jan 30, 2019
CVSS 3.x
8.8
HIGH
Source:
NVD
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS 2.x
8.3 HIGH
AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
Ubuntu

An issue was discovered on EE 4GEE HH70VB-2BE8GB3 HH70_E1_02.00_19 devices. Hardcoded root SSH credentials were discovered to be stored within the core_app binary utilised by the EE router for networking services. An attacker with knowledge of the default password (oelinux123) could login to the router via SSH as the root user, which could allow for the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system. This would also allow for the bypass of the AP Isolation mode that is supported by the router, as well as the settings for multiple Wireless networks, which a user may use for guest clients.

Weakness

The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key, which it uses for its own inbound authentication, outbound communication to external components, or encryption of internal data.

Affected Software

Name Vendor Start Version End Version
4gee_firmware Ee hh70_e1_02.00_19 (including) hh70_e1_02.00_19 (including)

Extended Description

Hard-coded credentials typically create a significant hole that allows an attacker to bypass the authentication that has been configured by the product administrator. This hole might be difficult for the system administrator to detect. Even if detected, it can be difficult to fix, so the administrator may be forced into disabling the product entirely. There are two main variations:

In the Inbound variant, a default administration account is created, and a simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching the product. If the password is ever discovered or published (a common occurrence on the Internet), then anybody with knowledge of this password can access the product. Finally, since all installations of the product will have the same password, even across different organizations, this enables massive attacks such as worms to take place. The Outbound variant applies to front-end systems that authenticate with a back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password which can be easily discovered. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end credentials into the front-end product. Any user of that program may be able to extract the password. Client-side systems with hard-coded passwords pose even more of a threat, since the extraction of a password from a binary is usually very simple.

Potential Mitigations

  • For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7].
  • In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.
  • For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash.
  • Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.
  • For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete.

References