Medtronic 2090 CareLink Programmer
uses a virtual private network connection to securely download updates. It does not verify it is still connected to this virtual private network before downloading updates. The affected products initially establish an encapsulated IP-based VPN connection to a Medtronic-hosted update network. Once the VPN is established, it makes a request to a HTTP (non-TLS) server across the VPN for updates, which responds and provides any available updates. The programmer-side (client) service responsible for this HTTP request does not check to ensure it is still connected to the VPN before making the HTTP request. Thus, an attacker could cause the VPN connection to terminate (through various methods and attack points) and intercept the HTTP request, responding with malicious updates via a man-in-the-middle attack. The affected products do not verify the origin or integrity of these updates, as it insufficiently relied on the security of the VPN. An attacker with remote network access to the programmer could influence these communications.
The product establishes a communication channel to (or from) an endpoint for privileged or protected operations, but it does not properly ensure that it is communicating with the correct endpoint.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
2090_carelink_programmer_firmware | Medtronic | * | * |
Attackers might be able to spoof the intended endpoint from a different system or process, thus gaining the same level of access as the intended endpoint. While this issue frequently involves authentication between network-based clients and servers, other types of communication channels and endpoints can have this weakness.