The signature verification routine in install.sh in yarnpkg/website through 2018-06-05 only verifies that the yarn release is signed by any (arbitrary) key in the local keyring of the user, and does not pin the signature to the yarn release key, which allows remote attackers to sign tampered yarn release packages with their own key.
The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Website | Yarnpkg | * | 2018-06-05 (including) |
Node-yarnpkg | Ubuntu | disco | * |
Node-yarnpkg | Ubuntu | eoan | * |
Node-yarnpkg | Ubuntu | groovy | * |
Node-yarnpkg | Ubuntu | hirsute | * |
Node-yarnpkg | Ubuntu | impish | * |
Node-yarnpkg | Ubuntu | kinetic | * |
Node-yarnpkg | Ubuntu | lunar | * |
Node-yarnpkg | Ubuntu | mantic | * |
Node-yarnpkg | Ubuntu | trusty | * |