In Apache Ignite 2.3 or earlier, the serialization mechanism does not have a list of classes allowed for serialization/deserialization, which makes it possible to run arbitrary code when 3-rd party vulnerable classes are present in Ignite classpath. The vulnerability can be exploited if the one sends a specially prepared form of a serialized object to one of the deserialization endpoints of some Ignite components - discovery SPI, Ignite persistence, Memcached endpoint, socket steamer.
Weakness
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ignite | Apache | * | 2.3.0 (including) |
| Red Hat Fuse Intergration Services 2.0 based on Fuse 6.3 R7 | RedHat | * |
Potential Mitigations
- Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization.
- An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
Related Attack Patterns
References
- http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103692
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:2405
- https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/45e7d5e2c6face85aab693f5ae0616563132ff757e5a558da80d0209%40%3Cdev.ignite.apache.org%3E
- http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103692
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:2405
- https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/45e7d5e2c6face85aab693f5ae0616563132ff757e5a558da80d0209%40%3Cdev.ignite.apache.org%3E