In Apache Hive 2.1.0 to 2.3.2, when COPY FROM FTP statement is run using HPL/SQL extension to Hive, a compromised/malicious FTP server can cause the file to be written to an arbitrary location on the cluster where the command is run from. This is because FTP client code in HPL/SQL does not verify the destination location of the downloaded file. This does not affect hive cli user and hiveserver2 user as hplsql is a separate command line script and needs to be invoked differently.
Weakness
The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.
Affected Software
Name |
Vendor |
Start Version |
End Version |
Hive |
Apache |
2.1.0 (including) |
2.3.2 (including) |
Potential Mitigations
- Run the code in a “jail” or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
References