A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC HMI Comfort Panels 4 - 22 (All versions < V14), SIMATIC HMI Comfort Outdoor Panels 7 & 15 (All versions < V14), SIMATIC HMI KTP Mobile Panels KTP400F, KTP700, KTP700F, KTP900 and KTP900F (All versions < V14), SIMATIC WinCC Runtime Advanced (All versions < V14), SIMATIC WinCC Runtime Professional (All versions < V14), SIMATIC WinCC (TIA Portal) (All versions < V14), SIMATIC HMI Classic Devices (TP/MP/OP/MP Mobile Panel) (All versions). The integrated web server (port 80/tcp and port 443/tcp) of the affected devices could allow an attacker to inject HTTP headers. An attacker must trick a valid user who is authenticated to the device into clicking on a malicious link to exploit the vulnerability. At the time of advisory publication no public exploitation of this security vulnerability was known.
The product receives data from an HTTP agent/component (e.g., web server, proxy, browser, etc.), but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes CR and LF characters before the data is included in outgoing HTTP headers.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Simatic_hmi_comfort_panels_firmware | Siemens | * | 14.0 (excluding) |
HTTP agents or components may include a web server, load balancer, reverse proxy, web caching proxy, application firewall, web browser, etc. Regardless of the role, they are expected to maintain coherent, consistent HTTP communication state across all components. However, including unexpected data in an HTTP header allows an attacker to specify the entirety of the HTTP message that is rendered by the client HTTP agent (e.g., web browser) or back-end HTTP agent (e.g., web server), whether the message is part of a request or a response.
When an HTTP request contains unexpected CR and LF characters, the server may respond with an output stream that is interpreted as “splitting” the stream into two different HTTP messages instead of one. CR is carriage return, also given by %0d or \r, and LF is line feed, also given by %0a or \n. In addition to CR and LF characters, other valid/RFC compliant special characters and unique character encodings can be utilized, such as HT (horizontal tab, also given by %09 or \t) and SP (space, also given as + sign or %20). These types of unvalidated and unexpected data in HTTP message headers allow an attacker to control the second “split” message to mount attacks such as server-side request forgery, cross-site scripting, and cache poisoning attacks. HTTP response splitting weaknesses may be present when: