An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.11.x. ARM never properly implemented grant table v2, either in the hypervisor or in Linux. Unfortunately, an ARM guest can still request v2 grant tables; they will simply not be properly set up, resulting in subsequent grant-related hypercalls hitting BUG() checks. An unprivileged guest can cause a BUG() check in the hypervisor, resulting in a denial-of-service (crash).
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xen | Xen | * | 4.11.0 (including) |
| Xen | Ubuntu | bionic | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | cosmic | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | disco | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | eoan | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | esm-infra/bionic | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | esm-infra/xenial | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | groovy | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | hirsute | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | impish | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
| Xen | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.