In Sophos Tester Tool 3.2.0.7 Beta, the driver loads (in the context of the application used to test an exploit or ransomware) the DLL using a payload that runs from NTDLL.DLL (so, its run in userland), but the driver doesnt perform any validation of this DLL (not its signature, not its hash, etc.). A person can change this DLL in a local way, or with a remote connection, to a malicious DLL with the same name – and when the product is used, this malicious DLL will be loaded, aka a DLL Hijacking attack.
The product searches for critical resources using an externally-supplied search path that can point to resources that are not under the product’s direct control.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sophos_tester | Sophos | 3.2.0.7-beta (including) | 3.2.0.7-beta (including) |
This might allow attackers to execute their own programs, access unauthorized data files, or modify configuration in unexpected ways. If the product uses a search path to locate critical resources such as programs, then an attacker could modify that search path to point to a malicious program, which the targeted product would then execute. The problem extends to any type of critical resource that the product trusts. Some of the most common variants of untrusted search path are: