In Apache Ignite before 2.4.8 and 2.5.x before 2.5.3, the serialization mechanism does not have a list of classes allowed for serialization/deserialization, which makes it possible to run arbitrary code when 3-rd party vulnerable classes are present in Ignite classpath. The vulnerability can be exploited if the one sends a specially prepared form of a serialized object to GridClientJdkMarshaller deserialization endpoint.
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ignite | Apache | * | 2.4.8 (excluding) |
| Ignite | Apache | 2.5.0 (excluding) | 2.5.3 (excluding) |
| Red Hat Fuse 7.2 | RedHat | camel-ignite | * |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.