A remote code execution vulnerability exists in MapR CLDB code, specifically in the JSON framework that is used in the CLDB code that handles login and ticket issuance. An attacker can use the class property of the JSON request sent to the CLDB to influence the JSON librarys decision on which Java class this JSON request is deserialized to. By doing so, the attacker can force the MapR CLDB to construct a URLClassLoader which loads a malicious Java class from a remote path and instantiate this object in the MapR CLDB, thus executing arbitrary code on the machine running the MapR CLDB and take over the cluster. By switching to the newer Jackson library and ensuring that all incoming JSON requests are only deserialized to the same class that it was serialized from, the vulnerability is fixed. This vulnerability affects the entire MapR core platform.
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mapr | Mapr | * | 5.2.2 (excluding) |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.