When Connect workers in Apache Kafka 2.0.0, 2.0.1, 2.1.0, 2.1.1, 2.2.0, 2.2.1, or 2.3.0 are configured with one or more config providers, and a connector is created/updated on that Connect cluster to use an externalized secret variable in a substring of a connector configuration property value, then any client can issue a request to the same Connect cluster to obtain the connectors task configuration and the response will contain the plaintext secret rather than the externalized secrets variables.
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kafka | Apache | 2.0.0 (including) | 2.0.0 (including) |
| Kafka | Apache | 2.0.1 (including) | 2.0.1 (including) |
| Kafka | Apache | 2.1.0 (including) | 2.1.0 (including) |
| Kafka | Apache | 2.1.1 (including) | 2.1.1 (including) |
| Kafka | Apache | 2.2.0 (including) | 2.2.0 (including) |
| Kafka | Apache | 2.2.1 (including) | 2.2.1 (including) |
| Kafka | Apache | 2.3.0 (including) | 2.3.0 (including) |
| Red Hat AMQ Streams 1 | RedHat | kafka | * |
Many communication channels can be “sniffed” (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data. Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product’s threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries. When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to “sniff” the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself.