CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2019-12820

Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

Published: Jul 19, 2019 | Modified: Nov 07, 2023
CVSS 3.x
5.6
MEDIUM
Source:
NVD
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
CVSS 2.x
4.3 MEDIUM
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
Ubuntu

A vulnerability was found in the app 2.0 of the Shenzhen Jisiwei i3 robot vacuum cleaner. Actions performed on the app such as changing a password, and personal information it communicates with the server, use unencrypted HTTP. As an example, while logging in through the app to a Jisiwei account, the login request is being sent in cleartext. The vulnerability exists in both the Android and iOS version of the app. An attacker could exploit this by using an MiTM attack on the local network to obtain someones login credentials, which gives them full access to the robot vacuum cleaner.

Weakness

The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.

Affected Software

Name Vendor Start Version End Version
I3_firmware Jisiwei 2.0 2.0

Extended Description

Many communication channels can be “sniffed” (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data. Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product’s threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries. When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to “sniff” the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself.

Potential Mitigations

References