In PyInstaller before version 3.6, only on Windows, a local privilege escalation vulnerability is present in this particular case: If a software using PyInstaller in onefile mode is launched by a privileged user (at least more than the current one) which have his TempPath resolving to a world writable directory. This is the case for example if the software is launched as a service or as a scheduled task using a system account (TempPath will be C:WindowsTemp). In order to be exploitable the software has to be (re)started after the attacker launch the exploit program, so for a service launched at startup, a service restart is needed (e.g. after a crash or an upgrade).
The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pyinstaller | Pyinstaller | * | 3.6 (excluding) |
New weaknesses can be exposed because running with extra privileges, such as root or Administrator, can disable the normal security checks being performed by the operating system or surrounding environment. Other pre-existing weaknesses can turn into security vulnerabilities if they occur while operating at raised privileges. Privilege management functions can behave in some less-than-obvious ways, and they have different quirks on different platforms. These inconsistencies are particularly pronounced if you are transitioning from one non-root user to another. Signal handlers and spawned processes run at the privilege of the owning process, so if a process is running as root when a signal fires or a sub-process is executed, the signal handler or sub-process will operate with root privileges.