A vulnerability in the detection engine of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to send data directly to the kernel of an affected device. The vulnerability exists because the software improperly filters Ethernet frames sent to an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted packets to the management interface of an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass the Layer 2 (L2) filters and send data directly to the kernel of the affected device. A malicious frame successfully delivered would make the target device generate a specific syslog entry.
Weakness
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adaptive_security_appliance_software | Cisco | * | 9.8.4 (excluding) |
| Firepower_threat_defense | Cisco | 6.2.1 (including) | 6.2.3.12 (excluding) |
| Firepower_threat_defense | Cisco | 6.3.0 (including) | 6.3.0.3 (excluding) |
| Adaptive_security_appliance_software | Cisco | 9.9 (including) | 9.9.2.50 (excluding) |
| Adaptive_security_appliance_software | Cisco | 9.10 (including) | 9.10.1.17 (excluding) |
Extended Description
Access control involves the use of several protection mechanisms such as:
When any mechanism is not applied or otherwise fails, attackers can compromise the security of the product by gaining privileges, reading sensitive information, executing commands, evading detection, etc. There are two distinct behaviors that can introduce access control weaknesses:
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/19.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/441.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/503.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/536.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/546.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html