A flaw was found in HAProxy before 2.0.6. In legacy mode, messages featuring a transfer-encoding header missing the chunked value were not being correctly rejected. The impact was limited but if combined with the http-reuse always setting, it could be used to help construct an HTTP request smuggling attack against a vulnerable component employing a lenient parser that would ignore the content-length header as soon as it saw a transfer-encoding one (even if not entirely valid according to the specification).
The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Haproxy | Haproxy | * | 2.0.6 (excluding) |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | RedHat | haproxy-0:1.8.23-3.el8 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 3.11 | RedHat | haproxy-0:1.8.23-3.el7 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.4 | RedHat | haproxy-0:2.0.13-3.el8 | * |
| Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | RedHat | rh-haproxy18-haproxy-0:1.8.24-2.el7 | * |
| Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 EUS | RedHat | rh-haproxy18-haproxy-0:1.8.24-2.el7 | * |
| Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.7 EUS | RedHat | rh-haproxy18-haproxy-0:1.8.24-2.el7 | * |
| Haproxy | Ubuntu | bionic | * |
| Haproxy | Ubuntu | disco | * |
| Haproxy | Ubuntu | eoan | * |
| Haproxy | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
| Haproxy | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
| Haproxy | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
HTTP requests or responses (“messages”) can be malformed or unexpected in ways that cause web servers or clients to interpret the messages in different ways than intermediary HTTP agents such as load balancers, reverse proxies, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc. For example, an adversary may be able to add duplicate or different header fields that a client or server might interpret as one set of messages, whereas the intermediary might interpret the same sequence of bytes as a different set of messages. For example, discrepancies can arise in how to handle duplicate headers like two Transfer-encoding (TE) or two Content-length (CL), or the malicious HTTP message will have different headers for TE and CL. The inconsistent parsing and interpretation of messages can allow the adversary to “smuggle” a message to the client/server without the intermediary being aware of it. This weakness is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions in the HTTP agents.