CVE-2019-19532

In the Linux kernel before 5.3.9, there are multiple out-of-bounds write bugs that can be caused by a malicious USB device in the Linux kernel HID drivers, aka CID-d9d4b1e46d95. This affects drivers/hid/hid-axff.c, drivers/hid/hid-dr.c, drivers/hid/hid-emsff.c, drivers/hid/hid-gaff.c, drivers/hid/hid-holtekff.c, drivers/hid/hid-lg2ff.c, drivers/hid/hid-lg3ff.c, drivers/hid/hid-lg4ff.c, drivers/hid/hid-lgff.c, drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c, drivers/hid/hid-microsoft.c, drivers/hid/hid-sony.c, drivers/hid/hid-tmff.c, and drivers/hid/hid-zpff.c.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-03/msg00021.html
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/12/03/4
• https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/ChangeLog-5.3.9
• https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d9d4b1e46d9543a82c23f6df03f4ad697dab361b
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/01/msg00013.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/03/msg00001.html
• https://usn.ubuntu.com/4226-1/