Use of unsafe yaml load. Allows instantiation of arbitrary objects. The flaw itself is caused by an unsafe parsing of YAML values which happens whenever an action message is processed to be sent, and allows for the creation of Python objects. Through this flaw in the ROS core package of actionlib, an attacker with local or remote access can make the ROS Master, execute arbitrary code in Python form. Consider yaml.safe_load() instead. Located first in actionlib/tools/library.py:132. See links for more info on the bug.
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Robot_operating_system | Openrobotics | - (including) | - (including) |
| Ros-actionlib | Ubuntu | bionic | * |
| Ros-actionlib | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
| Ros-actionlib | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.