Phoenix Hemodialysis Delivery System SW 3.36 and 3.40, The Phoenix Hemodialysis device does not support data-in-transit encryption (e.g., TLS/SSL) when transmitting treatment and prescription data on the network between the Phoenix system and the Exalis dialysis data management tool. An attacker with access to the network could observe sensitive treatment and prescription data sent between the Phoenix system and the Exalis tool.
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phoenix_x36_firmware | Baxter | 3.36 (including) | 3.36 (including) |
| Phoenix_x36_firmware | Baxter | 3.40 (including) | 3.40 (including) |
Many communication channels can be “sniffed” (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data. Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product’s threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries. When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to “sniff” the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself.