An issue was discovered in the stashcat app through 3.9.2 for macOS, Windows, Android, iOS, and possibly other platforms. It stores the client_key, the device_id, and the public key for end-to-end encryption in cleartext, enabling an attacker (by copying or having access to the local storage database file) to login to the system from any other computer, and get unlimited access to all data in the userss context.
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stashcat | Heinekingmedia | * | 3.9.2 (including) |
Because the information is stored in cleartext (i.e., unencrypted), attackers could potentially read it. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information. When organizations adopt cloud services, it can be easier for attackers to access the data from anywhere on the Internet. In some systems/environments such as cloud, the use of “double encryption” (at both the software and hardware layer) might be required, and the developer might be solely responsible for both layers, instead of shared responsibility with the administrator of the broader system/environment.