The Test Connection available in v7.x of the Red Hat Single Sign On application console can permit an authorized user to cause SMTP connections to be attempted to arbitrary hosts and ports of the users choosing, and originating from the RHSSO installation. By observing differences in the timings of these scans, an attacker may glean information about hosts and ports which they do not have access to scan directly.
Covert timing channels convey information by modulating some aspect of system behavior over time, so that the program receiving the information can observe system behavior and infer protected information.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Single_sign-on | Redhat | 7.0 (including) | 7.4 (including) |
In some instances, knowing when data is transmitted between parties can provide a malicious user with privileged information. Also, externally monitoring the timing of operations can potentially reveal sensitive data. For example, a cryptographic operation can expose its internal state if the time it takes to perform the operation varies, based on the state. Covert channels are frequently classified as either storage or timing channels. Some examples of covert timing channels are the system’s paging rate, the time a certain transaction requires to execute, and the time it takes to gain access to a shared bus.