In ZeroMQ before version 4.3.3, there is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Users with TCP transport public endpoints, even with CURVE/ZAP enabled, are impacted. If a raw TCP socket is opened and connected to an endpoint that is fully configured with CURVE/ZAP, legitimate clients will not be able to exchange any message. Handshakes complete successfully, and messages are delivered to the library, but the server application never receives them. This is patched in version 4.3.3.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Libzmq | Zeromq | * | 4.3.3 (excluding) |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | bionic | * |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | esm-apps/bionic | * |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | esm-apps/focal | * |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | esm-apps/xenial | * |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | esm-infra-legacy/trusty | * |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | focal | * |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | groovy | * |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | trusty/esm | * |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
| Zeromq3 | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.