In Open Enclave before version 0.12.0, an information disclosure vulnerability exists when an enclave application using the syscalls provided by the sockets.edl is loaded by a malicious host application. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could read privileged data from the enclave heap across trust boundaries. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would have to log on to an affected system and run a specially crafted application. The vulnerability would not allow an attacker to elevate user rights directly, but it could be used to obtain information otherwise considered confidential in an enclave, which could be used in further compromises. The issue has been addressed in version 0.12.0 and the current master branch. Users will need to to recompile their applications against the patched libraries to be protected from this vulnerability.
The product makes files or directories accessible to unauthorized actors, even though they should not be.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Openenclave | Openenclave | * | 0.12.0 (excluding) |
Web servers, FTP servers, and similar servers may store a set of files underneath a “root” directory that is accessible to the server’s users. Applications may store sensitive files underneath this root without also using access control to limit which users may request those files, if any. Alternately, an application might package multiple files or directories into an archive file (e.g., ZIP or tar), but the application might not exclude sensitive files that are underneath those directories. In cloud technologies and containers, this weakness might present itself in the form of misconfigured storage accounts that can be read or written by a public or anonymous user.