CVE-2020-15351

IDrive before 6.7.3.19 on Windows installs by default to %PROGRAMFILES(X86)%IDriveWindows with weak folder permissions granting any user modify permission (i.e., NT AUTHORITYAuthenticated Users:(OI)(CI)(M)) to the contents of the directory and its sub-folders. In addition, the program installs a service called IDriveService that runs as LocalSystem. Thus, any standard user can escalate privileges to NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM by substituting the services binary with a malicious one.

Weakness

During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
• Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/81.html

References

• https://github.com/active-labs/Advisories/blob/master/2020/ACTIVE-2020-004.md
• https://www.idrive.com/release-info#win