WriteOnePNGImage() from coders/png.c (the PNG coder) has a for loop with an improper exit condition that can allow an out-of-bounds READ via heap-buffer-overflow. This occurs because it is possible for the colormap to have less than 256 valid values but the loop condition will loop 256 times, attempting to pass invalid colormap data to the event logger. The patch replaces the hardcoded 256 value with a call to MagickMin() to ensure the proper value is used. This could impact application availability when a specially crafted input file is processed by ImageMagick. This flaw affects ImageMagick versions prior to 7.0.8-68.
Weakness
A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().
Affected Software
| Name |
Vendor |
Start Version |
End Version |
| Imagemagick |
Imagemagick |
* |
6.9.10-68 (excluding) |
| Imagemagick |
Imagemagick |
7.0.0-0 (including) |
7.0.8-68 (excluding) |
| Imagemagick |
Ubuntu |
bionic |
* |
| Imagemagick |
Ubuntu |
esm-infra/xenial |
* |
| Imagemagick |
Ubuntu |
focal |
* |
| Imagemagick |
Ubuntu |
groovy |
* |
| Imagemagick |
Ubuntu |
trusty |
* |
| Imagemagick |
Ubuntu |
trusty/esm |
* |
| Imagemagick |
Ubuntu |
upstream |
* |
| Imagemagick |
Ubuntu |
xenial |
* |
Potential Mitigations
- Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
- D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
- Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
- Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
References