CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2020-5218

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')

Published: Jan 27, 2020 | Modified: Feb 07, 2020
CVSS 3.x
4.3
MEDIUM
Source:
NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
CVSS 2.x
4 MEDIUM
AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
Ubuntu

Affected versions of Sylius give attackers the ability to switch channels via the _channel_code GET parameter in production environments. This was meant to be enabled only when kernel.debug is set to true. However, if no sylius_channel.debug is set explicitly in the configuration, the default value which is kernel.debug will be not resolved and cast to boolean, enabling this debug feature even if that parameter is set to false. Patch has been provided for Sylius 1.3.x and newer - 1.3.16, 1.4.12, 1.5.9, 1.6.5. Versions older than 1.3 are not covered by our security support anymore.

Weakness

The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.

Affected Software

Name Vendor Start Version End Version
Sylius Sylius 1.3.0 (including) 1.3.13 (excluding)
Sylius Sylius 1.4.0 (including) 1.4.6 (excluding)
Sylius Sylius 1.6.0 (including) 1.6.3 (excluding)
Sylius Sylius 1.5.0 (including) 1.5.0 (including)

Extended Description

HTTP requests or responses (“messages”) can be malformed or unexpected in ways that cause web servers or clients to interpret the messages in different ways than intermediary HTTP agents such as load balancers, reverse proxies, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc. For example, an adversary may be able to add duplicate or different header fields that a client or server might interpret as one set of messages, whereas the intermediary might interpret the same sequence of bytes as a different set of messages. For example, discrepancies can arise in how to handle duplicate headers like two Transfer-encoding (TE) or two Content-length (CL), or the malicious HTTP message will have different headers for TE and CL. The inconsistent parsing and interpretation of messages can allow the adversary to “smuggle” a message to the client/server without the intermediary being aware of it. This weakness is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions in the HTTP agents.

Potential Mitigations

References