Spring Integration framework provides Kryo Codec implementations as an alternative for Java (de)serialization. When Kryo is configured with default options, all unregistered classes are resolved on demand. This leads to the deserialization gadgets exploit when provided data contains malicious code for execution during deserialization. In order to protect against this type of attack, Kryo can be configured to require a set of trusted classes for (de)serialization. Spring Integration should be proactive against blocking unknown deserialization gadgets when configuring Kryo in code.
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spring_integration | Vmware | 4.3.0 (including) | 4.3.22 (including) |
| Spring_integration | Vmware | 5.1.0 (including) | 5.1.11 (including) |
| Spring_integration | Vmware | 5.2.0 (including) | 5.2.7 (including) |
| Spring_integration | Vmware | 5.3.0 (including) | 5.3.1 (including) |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.