OneDev is an all-in-one devops platform. In OneDev before version 4.0.3, there is an issue involving YAML parsing which can lead to post-auth remote code execution. In order to parse and process YAML files, OneDev uses SnakeYaml which by default (when not using SafeConstructor) allows the instantiation of arbitrary classes. We can leverage that to run arbitrary code by instantiating classes such as javax.script.ScriptEngineManager and using URLClassLoader to load the script engine provider, resulting in the instantiation of a user controlled class. For a full example refer to the referenced GHSA. This issue was addressed in 4.0.3 by only allowing certain known classes to be deserialized
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Onedev | Onedev_project | * | 4.0.3 (excluding) |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.