Polr is an open source URL shortener. in Polr before version 2.3.0, a vulnerability in the setup process allows attackers to gain admin access to site instances, even if they do not possess an existing account. This vulnerability exists regardless of users settings. If an attacker crafts a request with specific cookie headers to the /setup/finish endpoint, they may be able to obtain admin privileges on the instance. This is caused by a loose comparison (==) in SetupController that is susceptible to attack. The project has been patched to ensure that a strict comparison (===) is used to verify the setup key, and that /setup/finish verifies that no users table exists before performing any migrations or provisioning any new accounts. This is fixed in version 2.3.0. Users can patch this vulnerability without upgrading by adding abort(404) to the very first line of finishSetup in SetupController.php.
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. This allows attackers to bypass intended access restrictions.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Polr | Polrproject | * | 2.3.0 (excluding) |
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user’s privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource. When access control checks are incorrectly applied, users are able to access data or perform actions that they should not be allowed to perform. This can lead to a wide range of problems, including information exposures, denial of service, and arbitrary code execution.