TYPO3 is an open source PHP based web content management system. In TYPO3 before versions 8.7.40, 9.5.25, 10.4.14, 11.1.1, due to the lack of ensuring file extensions belong to configured allowed mime-types, attackers can upload arbitrary data with arbitrary file extensions - however, default fileDenyPattern successfully blocked files like .htaccess or malicious.php. Besides that, UploadedFileReferenceConverter transforming uploaded files into proper FileReference domain model objects handles possible file uploads for other extensions as well - given those extensions use the Extbase MVC framework, make use of FileReference items in their direct or inherited domain model definitions and did not implement their own type converter. In case this scenario applies, UploadedFileReferenceConverter accepts any file mime-type and persists files in the default location. In any way, uploaded files are placed in the default location /fileadmin/user_upload/, in most scenarios keeping the submitted filename - which allows attackers to directly reference files, or even correctly guess filenames used by other individuals, disclosing this information. No authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability. This is fixed in versions 8.7.40, 9.5.25, 10.4.14, 11.1.1.
Weakness
The product allows the attacker to upload or transfer files of dangerous types that can be automatically processed within the product’s environment.
Affected Software
| Name |
Vendor |
Start Version |
End Version |
| Typo3 |
Typo3 |
8.0.0 (including) |
8.7.40 (excluding) |
| Typo3 |
Typo3 |
9.0.0 (including) |
9.5.25 (excluding) |
| Typo3 |
Typo3 |
10.0.0 (including) |
10.4.14 (excluding) |
| Typo3 |
Typo3 |
11.0.0 (including) |
11.1.1 (excluding) |
Potential Mitigations
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- For example, limiting filenames to alphanumeric characters can help to restrict the introduction of unintended file extensions.
- Run the code in a “jail” or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
References