Restund is an open source NAT traversal server. The restund TURN server can be instructed to open a relay to the loopback address range. This allows you to reach any other service running on localhost which you might consider private. In the configuration that we ship (https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43) the status interface of restund is enabled and is listening on 127.0.0.1.The status interface allows users to issue administrative commands to restund like listing open relays or draining connections. It would be possible for an attacker to contact the status interface and issue administrative commands by setting XOR-PEER-ADDRESS to 127.0.0.1:{{restund_udp_status_port}} when opening a TURN channel. We now explicitly disallow relaying to loopback addresses, any addresses, link local addresses, and the broadcast address. As a workaround disable the status module in your restund configuration. However there might still be other services running on 127.0.0.0/8 that you do not want to have exposed. The turn module can be disabled. Restund will still perform STUN and this might already be enough for initiating calls in your environments. TURN is only used as a last resort when other NAT traversal options do not work. One should also make sure that the TURN server is set up with firewall rules so that it cannot relay to other addresses that you dont want the TURN server to relay to. For example other services in the same VPC where the TURN server is running. Ideally TURN servers should be deployed in an isolated fashion where they can only reach what they need to reach to perform their task of assisting NAT-traversal.
The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Restund | Wire | * | 0.4.15 (excluding) |
Resources such as files and directories may be inadvertently exposed through mechanisms such as insecure permissions, or when a program accidentally operates on the wrong object. For example, a program may intend that private files can only be provided to a specific user. This effectively defines a control sphere that is intended to prevent attackers from accessing these private files. If the file permissions are insecure, then parties other than the user will be able to access those files. A separate control sphere might effectively require that the user can only access the private files, but not any other files on the system. If the program does not ensure that the user is only requesting private files, then the user might be able to access other files on the system. In either case, the end result is that a resource has been exposed to the wrong party.