CVE-2021-21382

Restund is an open source NAT traversal server. The restund TURN server can be instructed to open a relay to the loopback address range. This allows you to reach any other service running on localhost which you might consider private. In the configuration that we ship (https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43) the status interface of restund is enabled and is listening on 127.0.0.1.The status interface allows users to issue administrative commands to restund like listing open relays or draining connections. It would be possible for an attacker to contact the status interface and issue administrative commands by setting XOR-PEER-ADDRESS to 127.0.0.1:{{restund_udp_status_port}} when opening a TURN channel. We now explicitly disallow relaying to loopback addresses, any addresses, link local addresses, and the broadcast address. As a workaround disable the status module in your restund configuration. However there might still be other services running on 127.0.0.0/8 that you do not want to have exposed. The turn module can be disabled. Restund will still perform STUN and this might already be enough for initiating calls in your environments. TURN is only used as a last resort when other NAT traversal options do not work. One should also make sure that the TURN server is set up with firewall rules so that it cannot relay to other addresses that you dont want the TURN server to relay to. For example other services in the same VPC where the TURN server is running. Ideally TURN servers should be deployed in an isolated fashion where they can only reach what they need to reach to perform their task of assisting NAT-traversal.

Weakness

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

Affected Software

Extended Description

Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user’s privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource. When access control checks are not applied, users are able to access data or perform actions that they should not be allowed to perform. This can lead to a wide range of problems, including information exposures, denial of service, and arbitrary code execution.

Potential Mitigations

• Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
• Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
• For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
• For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
• One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/665.html

References

• https://docs.wire.com/understand/restund.html
• https://github.com/coturn/coturn/security/advisories/GHSA-6g6j-r9rf-cm7p
• https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43
• https://github.com/wireapp/restund/pull/7
• https://github.com/wireapp/restund/security/advisories/GHSA-96j5-w9jq-pv2x
• https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2018-0732
• https://www.rtcsec.com/post/2021/01/details-about-cve-2020-26262-bypass-of-coturns-default-access-control-protection/#further-concerns-what-else