A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM ROS M2100 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS M2200 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS M969 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC20 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC30 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC40 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC41 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC8388 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC8388 V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RP110 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS400 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS401 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS416 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS416v2 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS416v2 V5.X (All versions < 5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000A (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000H (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000T (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900 (32M) V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900 (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900G (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900G (32M) V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900G (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900GP (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900L (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900W (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS910 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS910L (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS910W (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS920L (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS920W (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS930L (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS930W (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS940G (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS969 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100 (32M) V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100 (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100P (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100P (32M) V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100P (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2200 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2288 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2288 V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300 V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300P V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300P V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2488 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2488 V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900 V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900C (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900G V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900G V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900R (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG920P V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG920P V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSL910 (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RST2228 (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RST916C (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RST916P (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS i800 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS i801 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS i802 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS i803 (All versions < V4.3.7). The DHCP client in affected devices fails to properly sanitize incoming DHCP packets. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause memory to be overwritten, potentially allowing remote code execution.
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ruggedcom_ros_i800 | Siemens | * | 4.3.7 (excluding) |
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].