CVE-2021-32618

The Python Flask-Security-Too package is used for adding security features to your Flask application. It is an is an independently maintained version of Flask-Security based on the 3.0.0 version of Flask-Security. All versions of Flask-Security-Too allow redirects after many successful views (e.g. /login) by honoring the ?next query param. There is code in FS to validate that the url specified in the next parameter is either relative OR has the same netloc (network location) as the requesting URL. This check utilizes Pythons urlsplit library. However many browsers are very lenient on the kind of URL they accept and fill in the blanks when presented with a possibly incomplete URL. As a concrete example - setting http://login?next=github.com will pass FSs relative URL check however many browsers will gladly convert this to http://github.com. Thus an attacker could send such a link to an unwitting user, using a legitimate site and have it redirect to whatever site they want. This is considered a low severity due to the fact that if Werkzeug is used (which is very common with Flask applications) as the WSGI layer, it by default ALWAYS ensures that the Location header is absolute - thus making this attack vector mute. It is possible for application writers to modify this default behavior by setting the autocorrect_location_header=False`.

Weakness

A web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a Redirect. This simplifies phishing attacks.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
• When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
• Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
• Use a list of approved URLs or domains to be used for redirection.
• When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
• For example, ID 1 could map to “/login.asp” and ID 2 could map to “http://www.example.com/". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.
• Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
• Many open redirect problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, such as cookies and hidden form fields.

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/178.html

References

• https://github.com/Flask-Middleware/flask-security/issues/486
• https://github.com/Flask-Middleware/flask-security/security/advisories/GHSA-6qmf-fj6m-686c