Qihoo 360 (https://www.360.cn/) Qihoo 360 Safeguard (https://www.360.cn/) Qihoo 360 Chrome (https://browser.360.cn/ee/) is affected by: Buffer Overflow. The impact is: execute arbitrary code (remote). The component is: This is a set of vulnerabilities affecting popular software, and the installation packages correspond to versions 360 Safeguard(12.1.0.1004,12.1.0.1005,13.1.0.1001) , 360 Total Security(10.8.0.1060,10.8.0.1213), 360 Safe Browser & 360 Chrome(12. The attack vector is: On the browser vulnerability, just open a link to complete the vulnerability exploitation remotely; on the client software, you need to locally execute the vulnerability exploitation program, which of course can be achieved with the full chain of browser vulnerability. ΒΆΒΆ This is a set of the most serious vulnerabilities that exist on Qihoo 360s PC client multiple popular software, remote vulnerabilities can be accomplished by opening a link to arbitrary code execution on both security browsers, in conjunction with the exploitation of local vulnerabilities that allow spyware to persist without being scanned to permanently reside on the target PC computer (because local vulnerabilities target Qihoo 360 companys antivirus software kernel flaws); this set of remote and local vulnerabilities in perfect coordination, to achieve an information security fallacy, on Qihoo 360s antivirus software vulnerability, not only can not be scanned out of the virus, but will help the virus persistently control the target computer, while Qihoo 360 claims to be a secure browser, which exists in the kernel vulnerability but help the composition of the remote vulnerability.(Security expert Memory Corruptor have reported this set of vulnerabilities to the corresponding vendor, all vulnerabilities have been fixed and the vendor rewarded thousands of dollars to this security expert)
The product copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer, leading to a buffer overflow.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total_security | 360 | 10.8.0.1060 (including) | 10.8.0.1060 (including) |
| Total_security | 360 | 10.8.0.1213 (including) | 10.8.0.1213 (including) |
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:
Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Run the code in a “jail” or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.