Apache jUDDI uses several classes related to Javas Remote Method Invocation (RMI) which (as an extension to UDDI) provides an alternate transport for accessing UDDI services. RMI uses the default Java serialization mechanism to pass parameters in RMI invocations. A remote attacker can send a malicious serialized object to the above RMI entries. The objects get deserialized without any check on the incoming data. In the worst case, it may let the attacker run arbitrary code remotely. For both jUDDI web service applications and jUDDI clients, the usage of RMI is disabled by default. Since this is an optional feature and an extension to the UDDI protocol, the likelihood of impact is low. Starting with 3.3.10, all RMI related code was removed.
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juddi | Apache | * | 3.3.10 (excluding) |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.