CVE-2021-39197

better_errors is an open source replacement for the standard Rails error page with more information rich error pages. It is also usable outside of Rails in any Rack app as Rack middleware. better_errors prior to 2.8.0 did not implement CSRF protection for its internal requests. It also did not enforce the correct Content-Type header for these requests, which allowed a cross-origin simple request to be made without CORS protection. These together left an application with better_errors enabled open to cross-origin attacks. As a developer tool, better_errors documentation strongly recommends addition only to the development bundle group, so this vulnerability should only affect development environments. Please ensure that your project limits better_errors to the development group (or the non-Rails equivalent). Starting with release 2.8.x, CSRF protection is enforced. It is recommended that you upgrade to the latest release, or minimally to ~> 2.8.3. There are no known workarounds to mitigate the risk of using older releases of better_errors.

Weakness

The web application does not, or can not, sufficiently verify whether a well-formed, valid, consistent request was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the request.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
• For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
• Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
• Use the “double-submitted cookie” method as described by Felten and Zeller:
• When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user’s machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
• Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
• This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/111.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/462.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/467.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/62.html

References

• https://github.com/BetterErrors/better_errors/commit/8e8e796bfbde4aa088741823c8a3fc6df2089bb0
• https://github.com/BetterErrors/better_errors/discussions/507
• https://github.com/BetterErrors/better_errors/pull/474
• https://github.com/BetterErrors/better_errors/security/advisories/GHSA-w3j4-76qw-wwjm
• https://github.com/BetterErrors/better_errors/commit/8e8e796bfbde4aa088741823c8a3fc6df2089bb0
• https://github.com/BetterErrors/better_errors/discussions/507
• https://github.com/BetterErrors/better_errors/pull/474
• https://github.com/BetterErrors/better_errors/security/advisories/GHSA-w3j4-76qw-wwjm