Puma is a HTTP 1.1 server for Ruby/Rack applications. Prior to versions 5.5.1 and 4.3.9, using puma with a proxy which forwards HTTP header values which contain the LF character could allow HTTP request smugggling. A client could smuggle a request through a proxy, causing the proxy to send a response back to another unknown client. The only proxy which has this behavior, as far as the Puma team is aware of, is Apache Traffic Server. If the proxy uses persistent connections and the client adds another request in via HTTP pipelining, the proxy may mistake it as the first requests body. Puma, however, would see it as two requests, and when processing the second request, send back a response that the proxy does not expect. If the proxy has reused the persistent connection to Puma to send another request for a different client, the second response from the first client will be sent to the second client. This vulnerability was patched in Puma 5.5.1 and 4.3.9. As a workaround, do not use Apache Traffic Server with puma.
The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Puma | Puma | * | 4.3.8 (including) |
| Puma | Puma | 5.0.0 (including) | 5.5.0 (including) |
HTTP requests or responses (“messages”) can be malformed or unexpected in ways that cause web servers or clients to interpret the messages in different ways than intermediary HTTP agents such as load balancers, reverse proxies, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc. For example, an adversary may be able to add duplicate or different header fields that a client or server might interpret as one set of messages, whereas the intermediary might interpret the same sequence of bytes as a different set of messages. For example, discrepancies can arise in how to handle duplicate headers like two Transfer-encoding (TE) or two Content-length (CL), or the malicious HTTP message will have different headers for TE and CL. The inconsistent parsing and interpretation of messages can allow the adversary to “smuggle” a message to the client/server without the intermediary being aware of it. This weakness is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions in the HTTP agents.