CVE-2021-41190

The OCI Distribution Spec project defines an API protocol to facilitate and standardize the distribution of content. In the OCI Distribution Specification version 1.0.0 and prior, the Content-Type header alone was used to determine the type of document during push and pull operations. Documents that contain both “manifests” and “layers” fields could be interpreted as either a manifest or an index in the absence of an accompanying Content-Type header. If a Content-Type header changed between two pulls of the same digest, a client may interpret the resulting content differently. The OCI Distribution Specification has been updated to require that a mediaType value present in a manifest or index match the Content-Type header used during the push and pull operations. Clients pulling from a registry may distrust the Content-Type header and reject an ambiguous document that contains both “manifests” and “layers” fields or “manifests” and “config” fields if they are unable to update to version 1.0.1 of the spec.

Weakness

The product allocates or initializes a resource such as a pointer, object, or variable using one type, but it later accesses that resource using a type that is incompatible with the original type.

Affected Software

Extended Description

When the product accesses the resource using an incompatible type, this could trigger logical errors because the resource does not have expected properties. In languages without memory safety, such as C and C++, type confusion can lead to out-of-bounds memory access. While this weakness is frequently associated with unions when parsing data with many different embedded object types in C, it can be present in any application that can interpret the same variable or memory location in multiple ways. This weakness is not unique to C and C++. For example, errors in PHP applications can be triggered by providing array parameters when scalars are expected, or vice versa. Languages such as Perl, which perform automatic conversion of a variable of one type when it is accessed as if it were another type, can also contain these issues.

References

• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/11/19/10
• https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec/commit/ac28cac0557bcd3084714ab09f9f2356fe504923
• https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec/security/advisories/GHSA-mc8v-mgrf-8f4m
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/3TUZNDAH2B26VPBK342UC3BHZNLBUXGX/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/4334HT7AZPLWNYHW4ARU6JBUF3VZJPZN/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/A2RRFNTMFYKOTRKD37F5ANMCIO3GGJML/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DX63GRWFEI5RVMYV6XLMCG4OHPWZML27/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/RZTO6N55WHKHIZI4IMLY2QFBPMVTAERM/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/SQBCYJUIM5GVCMFUPRWKRZNXMMI5EFA4/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/T4OJ764CKKCWCVONHD4YXTGR7HZ7LRUV/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YIGVQWOA5XXCQXEOOKZX4CDAGLBDRPRX/