An issue was discovered in Luna Simo PPR1.180610.011/202001031830. It mishandles software updates such that local third-party apps can provide a spoofed software update file that contains an arbitrary shell script and arbitrary ARM binary, where both will be executed as the root user with an SELinux domain named osi. To exploit this vulnerability, a local third-party app needs to have write access to external storage to write the spoofed update at the expected path. The vulnerable system binary (i.e., /system/bin/osi_bin) does not perform any authentication of the update file beyond ensuring that it is encrypted with an AES key (that is hard-coded in the vulnerable system binary). Processes executing with the osi SELinux domain can programmatically perform the following actions: install apps, grant runtime permissions to apps (including permissions with protection levels of dangerous and development), access extensive Personally Identifiable Information (PII) using the programmatically grant permissions, uninstall apps, set the default launcher app to a malicious launcher app that spoofs other apps, set a network proxy to intercept network traffic, unload kernel modules, set the default keyboard to a keyboard that has keylogging functionality, examine notification contents, send text messages, and more. The spoofed update can optionally contain an arbitrary ARM binary that will be locally stored in internal storage and executed at system startup to achieve persistent code execution as the root user with the osi SELinux domain. This ARM binary will continue to execute at startup even if the app that provided the spoofed update is uninstalled.
The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key, which it uses for its own inbound authentication, outbound communication to external components, or encryption of internal data.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| G90_firmware | Bluproducts | - (including) | - (including) |
Hard-coded credentials typically create a significant hole that allows an attacker to bypass the authentication that has been configured by the product administrator. This hole might be difficult for the system administrator to detect. Even if detected, it can be difficult to fix, so the administrator may be forced into disabling the product entirely. There are two main variations:
In the Inbound variant, a default administration account is created, and a simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching the product. If the password is ever discovered or published (a common occurrence on the Internet), then anybody with knowledge of this password can access the product. Finally, since all installations of the product will have the same password, even across different organizations, this enables massive attacks such as worms to take place. The Outbound variant applies to front-end systems that authenticate with a back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password which can be easily discovered. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end credentials into the front-end product. Any user of that program may be able to extract the password. Client-side systems with hard-coded passwords pose even more of a threat, since the extraction of a password from a binary is usually very simple.